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FEDERAL EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT
T. J. LEWIS, JR.*
Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court of the United States
has said of the Federal Employers Liability Act:
The Federal Employers Liability Act was designed to put
on the railroad industry some of the cost of the legs, arms,
eyes and lives which it consumed in its operation .... The
purpose of the act was to change that strict rule of li-
ability to lift from the employees the prodigious burden
of personal injuries that system had placed upon them,
and to relieve men, who by the exigencies and necessities
of life are bound to labor from the risks and hazards that
could be avoided or lessened by the exercise of proper care
on the part of the employer in providing safe and proper
machinery and equipment with which the employee does
his work.'
This is harsh language and to better understand the reason
for this statement and the necessity of the enactment of the
Federal Employers Liability Act, a background of the rail-
road industry prior to the passage of this act should be noted.
In 1888, a railroad brakeman had one chance in five of dying
a natural death. The average life expectancy of a railroad
switchman in 1893 was seven years. In 1907, the year before
the Act was passed, 4,534 railroad men were killed in railroad
work and 87,634 were injured. In 1950, more men were
engaged in railroad work but only 329 were killed and 22,000
injured, (this information is based on reports of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission).
In 1899, President Harrison said:
It is a reproach to our civilization that any class of
American workmen should, in the pursuit of a necessary
and useful vocation, be subjected to a peril of life and limb
as great as that of a soldier in time of war.
2
Prior to the passage of this Act, there was no uniform require-
ment that railroads provide any standard equipment There
*Lewis, Lewis, Whaley and Cagle, Atlanta, Ga.
1. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 93 L. Ed. 497 (1949)
2. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 49 L. Ed. 363 (1904).
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were no automatic couplers; there were no air brakes on
trains. Consequently, the men had to go between cars to un-
couple them by lifting a pin from a link. They also had to
climb to the tops of cars to stop trains by the use of hand
brakes.
Before 1908, all the common law defenses were available to
the railroad employer. If the employee was injured through
the negligence of a fellow servant, he was unable to recover
damages for his injury. If he were guilty of negligence, that
was likewise a defense available to the railroad. When an
employee went to work for a railroad, he assumed all the
risks normally incident to the job and almost anything that
caused him to be injured was a risk that he had assumed.
As we know it today, the Federal Employers Liability Act
provides essentially:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in
commerce between any of the several States ... shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in
case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or
husband and children of such employee; . . . for such
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, ... or other equipment.3
The Federal Employers Iiability Act is not a workmen's
compensation act and in order for an employee who has been
injured to recover under the act, he must prove that the car-
rier was, to some extent, negligent. A railroad employer is
not an insurer of employees safety. Every case is different,
of course, and it would be an impossibility to list here every
example of a railroad's negligence which could result in a
legitimate claim by an employee, but a few situations will be
mentioned.
All railroad companies have an operating rule book which
their employees are supposed to follow in carrying out their
day's work. If an employee violates a company rule a fellow
3. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
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employee is injured, the railroad will be held responsible for
that injury. On the other hand, however, if the injured em-
ployee has violated a safety rule or operating rule, that does
not necessarily make his violation of that rule the sole prox-
imate cause of his injury.
Under the decisions, employees have been allowed to recover
on the basis of "hindsight". For instance, if an injured em-
ployee can show that the job which he was performing when
he was injured could have been performed in a safer manner
that that selected by his superior, then he will be entitled to
recover.4
The maintenance of an unsafe place to work constitutes
negligence on the part of the carrier and this can take many
forms: objects too near the track; a frieght car improperly
loaded;5 rocks or lumps of coal6 along the right-of-way; oil,
grease, snow or even mud being present in a place where em-
ployees must walk and where they would likely slip if they
stepped in or on the same. It has also been held that the
actions of a fellow employee may render a place unsafe. An
example of this might occur when an engineer makes a sudden
or unusual stop or start causing a fellow employee to be
thrown off balance and fall.
Quite vital to this Act is the fact that the carrier owes a
non-delegable duty to furnish its employees with a safe place
to work and safe appliances with which to perform their
duties. This is a continuing duty from which the carrier can-
not escape. This duty follows wherever the employee is sent
to work, whether on the premises of the master or not, and
whether the employer has control of the premises or not.7
A recovery in these cases is allowed for the same items as
in any other negligence case, except that in a death case the
law allows the personal representative of the estate of the
deceased to recover only the pecuniary loss occasioned by
the death of the deceased. In the case of an employe who has
been killed in the line of duty, there is one other advantage
that the plaintiff has in prosecuting the case that is not
present under many state laws; this advantage is that the
4. Boston & M.R.R. v. Meech, 156 F. 2d 109 (1st Cir. 1946).
5. Webb v. Illinois Cent., 352 U.S. 512, 1 L. Ed. 2d. 503 (1957).
6. Cereste v. New York N.H. & H. R. R., 231 F. 2d. 50 (2d Cir. 1956).
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deceased, if there were no eye witnesses to the occurrence, is
presumed to have been in his proper place and in the proper
performance of his duties.
It has not always been the case, but since the passage by
Congress of the amendment to this Act in 1939, the Supreme
Court has construed this Act most favorably to injured em-
ployees. In 1957, Justice Brennan of the United States Su-
preme Court said in an opinion:
Under this statute, the test of a jury case is simply
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that
the employer's negligence played any part even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which
damages are sought.8
It should be pointed out that the engagement by the em-
ployer and employee in Interstate Commerce is one of the
prerequisites for coming under the protection of this Act.
Shortly after the passage of the Act in 1908, the courts were
rather inconsistent in their holdings in this regard. At one
moment, an employee could be engaged in Interstate Commerce
and covered by the Act, and the next moment, engaged in
Intrastate Commerce and not have the Act's protection. The
amendment of 1939 eliminated this confusion by allowing
protection if the employee was engaged in the furtherance
of Interstate Commerce or if his duties closely and substan-
tially affected such commerce.
Recently, the Supreme Court made it almost impossible to
be employed by a railroad and not be engaged in Interstate
Commerce or in the furtherance thereof by its decision in
the Reed case." This case involved a female employee who
worked in an office building in Philadelphia and whose duties
required that she take tracings from a filing cabinet and give
them to a messenger who took them to a blueprint shop. There
the blueprints were prepared and sent to various points on
the lines of the Pennsylvania Railroad. She was injured when
a cracked window pane blew in during a high wind. Her work
was held to be in the furtherance of Interstate Commerce, and
she was covered by the Federal Employers Liability Act.
It should be pointed out that this Federal law is uniform in
every state and a railroad worker's cause of action cannot
be defeated because of local rules of practice and procedure.
8. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 352 U.S. 500, 1 L. Ed. 2d. 493 (1957).
9. Reed v. Pennsylvania R. R., 351 U.S. 502, 100 L. Ed. 1366 (1956).
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United States Supreme Court cannot accept as final,
a State Court's interpretation of allegations in a com-
plaint asserting a Federal right... Strict local rules of
pleading cannot be used to impose unnecesssary burdens
upon rights of recovery authorized by Federal laws ...
Certiorari was granted because the implications of the
dismissal were important to a uniform application of the
statute in state and federal courts. 10
Though assumption of risks as a defense in these actions
was eliminated by the 1939 amendment to the Act," it still
crept into cases occasionally. The Tiller case' 2 clarified this
when the Supreme Court declared:
We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of the assump-
tion of risks was obliterated from the law by the 1939
amendment and that Congress, by abolishing the defense
of assumption of risks in that statute did not mean to
leave open the identical defense for the master by chang-
ing its name to "non-negligence".
Whereas prior to 1939, contributory negligence was an ab-
solute defense to an action of this type, it likewise was
obliterated to the extent that an employee's claim was no
longer defeated if he was contributorily negligent, the dam-
ages he was entitled to recover being diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to him. The effect
of the Rogers decision, supra, was to allow an injured em-
ployee to recover even though he was 99% responsible for
his own injury, if the railroads's negligence was responsible
for the other 1% of his injuries.
In actions brought under this Act, the old common law de-
fenses are eliminated, and contributory negligence serves only
to diminish the damages the employee otherwise would be
entitled to recover. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has also
been held applicable in cases under the F.E.L.A.'
2
There have been cases where there were no witnesses to
what occurred, but under some of these circumstances, ob-
viously if human and mechanical operations had not been
defective or negligently performed, the event would not have
10. Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 94 L. Ed. 100 (1949).
11. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1958).
12. Tiller v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610 (1943).
13. Jesionowsky v. Boston & M. R. R., 329 U.S. 452, 91 L. Ed. 416
(1947).
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occurred. The agency or instrumentality which causes the
injury or death must, of course, have been under the exclusive
control of the defendant or its agents. In the case where an
engineer was found dead from electric shock,14 or in a derail-
ment of a train or cars,15 or the explosion of a boiler,16 the
injuries and/or deaths could not have occurred if everything
had functioned properly and the jury in each instance was
allowed to infer negligence and causation. As mentioned
above, it is almost impossible to lay down any strict rules as
to what constitutes negligence or what is res ipsa loquitur.
However, in most instances of injury to a railroad employee,
there is somewhere a negligent act, and the Supreme Court
has declared that a jury trial is part and parcel of the relief
afforded by Congress under this Act.17 And it is rare when
a court would be authorized to take a case away from a jury
by directed verdict or otherwise.
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT
Liability under the F.E.L.A. is predicated upon the common
law basis of negligence. However, Congress has passed acts
known as Safety Appliance Acts which require locomotives
and freight cars to be equipped with certain safety devices,
and a violation of any of these requirements (acts), imposes
absolute liability without regard to negligence.' 8 The F.E.L.A.
and the Safety Appliance Acts are in pari materia. One pro-
vides the remedy, (Sec. 51-60) ; and the other the basis for
the claim, (See. 2-23). The Safety Appliance Statutes do not
provide for recovery by those injured nor do they specify the
damage that the injured person might be entitled to recover.
The acts merely require that locomotives and cars in use by
carriers shall be equipped with certain devices, which are in
safe and proper working order in accordance with the require-
ments of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The phrase
"in use" as used above, does not mean necessarily that a car
need be loaded with merchandise, and in route; it means
simply that the car has not been withdrawn from service of
the carrier.
14. Sweeting v. Pennsylvania R. R., 142 F. 2d. 611 (3d. Cir. 1944).
15. Jesionowsky v. Boston & M. R. R., 329 U.S. 452 91 L. Ed. 416 (1947).
16. Atlantic C. L. V. Weatherington, 245 Ala. 313, 16 So. 2d. 720 (1944).
17. Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 87 L. Ed. 1444 (1943).
18. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 317 U.S. 481, 87 L. Ed. 411 (1943).
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If a railroad employee has been injured because of the
failure or improper operation of any one of the designated
safety appliances, the defenses of due or reasonable care may
not be raised, and the carrier is not excused from liability no
matter how diligent it may have been, for the action is not
based upon negligence. 19 Also, it matters not when or where
the defect or insufficiency occurs; if the appliance fails,
there is liability on the part of the railroad which cannot be
escaped.
Congress gave the Interstate Commerce Commission power
to promulgate these specifications, rules and regulations and
they have the force and effect of law.
In discussing the various safety appliances separately, we
take first the automatic couplers. 20 This statute provides that
it shall be unlawful for any common carrier to haul or use
on its lines any car not equipped with couplers coupling auto-
matically on impact and which can be uncoupled without the
necessity of men going between the cars. This has been
liberally interpreted by many courts so that now, in simple
language, if anything at all goes wrong with an automatic
coupler and an employee is injured thereby, he may recover.
It is not necessary to show a "bad" condition of the coupler
or that it had some particular defect. It is only necessary to
show that when used in the usual and ordinary manner, it
failed to properly function. If cars fail to couple automatically
on impact, fail to remain coupled until released by some pur-
poseful act, or if for any reason a trainman must go between
railroad cars to adjust the coupling or to uncouple cars, the
act has been violated, and the fact that the couplers may have
performed properly before and after the occasion in question
constitutes no defense. The test is whether the appliance
functioned properly on the occasion in question. Similarly, in
cases brought for a violation of the hand brake act, it is not
necessary to show an actual break or visible defect-it need
only be shown that the hand brake when used in the usual,
customary and ordinary manner failed to perform properly.
"The test, in fact, is the performance of the appliance." 22
In addition to hand brakes just mentioned, Section 11 of
Title 45, U.S.C. covers these appliances on railroad cars: sill
19. Brady v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 82 L. Ed.
614 (1938).
20. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. 32 (1958).
22. Myers v. Reading, 331 U.S. 477, 91 L. Ed. 1615 (1947).
1962]
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steps, ladders, grab irons, hand-holds and running boarda.
The same strict compliance is required with regard to these
appliances, i.e., that they be secure and in a condition which
meets the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.
It has been held that even though the safety appliance
which is defective is not being used by a trainman for the
purpose for which it was or is intended, his claim is not de-
feated. If the defect was the proximate cause of the injury,
he will be allowed to recover.
23
The specific items that have been dealt with up to this
point are safety appliances to be found on freight cars. On an
engine, whether a steam locomotive or diesel, each part of the
engine or locomotive is considered a safety appliance. Not
only the couplers, the braking system, ladders, etc., but every
nut, bolt and screw is a safety appliance.
Section 23, Title 45, U.S.C. provides that it shall be unlaw-
ful for any carrier to use on its line any locomotive unless
said locomotive and all parts and appurtenances thereof are
in proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which
they are put, and that the same may be employed in the active
service of such carrier without unnecessary peril to life or
limb. In the McCarthy v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. case
24
McCarthy, an engineer, noticed a "hot box" on the pony truck
of his locomotive. This was a dangerous condition and Mc-
Carthy knew it. The condition was pointed out to him several
times at different points on his run. He was even advised to
put the engine off at the next station and get another engine,
but he ignored this instruction and went on. A short while
before he completed his run into Chicago, the pony truck
broke down because of the hot box, the engine turned over
and McCarthy was killed. Under the statutes, the defendant's
duty was an absolute and continuing one to furnish plaintiff's
decedent a locomotive in safe condition to operate. The de-
cisions have held that it makes no difference where the defect
occurs. The fact that it does occur is what gives rise to a
cause of action.
The defendant's answer tendered the issue that the sole
proximate cause of the accident was the fact that the
decedent continued to use the locomotive after he knew
23. Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 68 L. Ed. 285 (1923).
24. 156 F. 2d. 877 (7th Cir. 1946).
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of its defective condition and failed to report it as was
his duty under the rules. These acts constituted no de-
fense. The decedent's acts were all concurring acts with
the act of defendant in violation of the statute and were
either acts of contributory negligence or assumption of
risks of known danger from both of which as we have
pointed out, the decedent had been relieved by the stat-
ute.
Railroads engaged in interstate commerce are required by
this statute25 to have locomotives equipped with power driving-
wheel brakes and a sufficient number of cars in the train
equipped with an air brake system so that the engineer can
control the movement of the train by the train brake system
and brakemen will not be required to use the hand brakes
for that purpose. Here again it is not necessary to show any
particular defect but only that the equipment failed to func-
tion properly or that an insufficient number of cars were
coupled with air for the speed of the train to be controlled by
the engineer.
The air brake system is not required on trains doing switch-
ing operations in freight yards but it has been held many times
that, where an engine pulls cars over grade crossings within a
city, this section of the act must be complied with.
This code section has been extended by court decisi6ns so
that it even covers a motor car operating over the tracks of
a railroad if it is pulling other equipment.26
In all actions brought against railroads under the Safety
Appliance Acts, contributory negligence does not enter the
picture even to diminish damages as it does under the F.E.L.A.
in negligence action.
Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or
killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory
negligence in any case where the violation by such com-
mon carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of em-
ployees contributed to the injury or death of such em-
ployee.
27
Several other sections of this act should be mentioned in
closing. The railroads are prohibited from entering into a
contract or promulgating rules or regulations the purpose
25. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
26. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Jackson, 233 F. 2d. 660 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
27. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1958).
1962]
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and intent of which shall be to enable the carrier to exempt
itself from any liability created by this act.28
In personal injury actions brought under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act the employee has three years in which
to commence his action in a state or federal court in the dis-
trict of the residence of the defendant, or in that district
where the cause of action arose, or any jurisdiction in which
the defendant shall be doing business at the time of the com-
mencement of such action. The jurisdiction of the United
States courts and the courts of the several states is concur-
rent.29
Railroads are prevented by statute30 from interfering with
employees who are called upon to give information to a person
in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of
any employee. This section provides for a penalty to be im-
posed on any person who attempts by contract, rule, regulation
or by threats or intimidation to prevent a person giving volun-
tarily such information.
Railroading is still one of the most hazardous of occupations
but Congress, through these Acts and the courts through
liberal interpretation of them, have afforded a remedy.
28. 35 Stat. 66 (1908) 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1958).
29. 36 Stat. 291 (1910J, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
30. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1958).
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